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Corporate fraud is costly, involving hundreds of billions of dollars in 
lost reputational and out-of-pocket costs for stakeholders and hundreds of 
thousands of job losses for employees, suppliers, and customers.  To 
prevent fraud, general counsels are charged with the responsibility of 
gatekeeping in the corporation.  They understand the law and they are 
expected to use their legal expertise to advise on, intervene in, and report 
suspicions of fraud.  In spite of their legally-mandated central role, 
corporate counsels typically do not appear to discover any corporate 
wrongdoing, at least they are not the ones reporting it.  In this paper, we 
analyze the potential reasons why corporate counsels keep silent in the face 
of potential wrongdoing in their own firms and propose policy 
recommendations to better protect shareholders’ interests against self-
dealing by top management. 
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate fraud is costly.  It involves the loss of hundreds of billions 
of dollars in reputational and out-of-pocket costs for corporations, 
shareholders, bondholders, and other stakeholders, as well as hundreds of 
thousands of lost jobs for employees, suppliers, and customers.1  In some 
cases, it has also resulted in the loss of lives and environmental disaster.2
More than ten years after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 
2002,3 which was designed to make corporations more transparent, more 
accountable, and therefore less likely to engage in corporate fraud, large-
scale, corporate scandals show no sign of abating.4  Recent high-level, post-
SOX additions to corporate scandals include the General Motors ignition 
 1.  See Alexander Dyck et al., How Pervasive is Corporate Fraud? 2-3 (Aug. 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www-2.rotman.utoronto.ca/facbios/file/Pervasive.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U3QR-DM6Y] (estimating that in the 1996-2004 period, one out of seven 
large, publicly traded companies engaged in fraud and the average cost of fraud was $380 
billion per year). 
 2.  See Mike Spector, Michigan Won’t Discipline Lawyers in GM Ignition Case, THE
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/michigan-won-t-discipline-
lawyers-in-gm-ignition-case-1459080002 [https://perma.cc/2BEX-6RFP] (linking the GM 
ignition scandal to 124 deaths). 
 3.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 4.  See Accounting Scandals: The Dozy Watchdogs, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 11, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21635978-some-13-years-after-enron-auditors-
still-cant-stop-managers-cooking-books-time-some [https://perma.cc/UQ92-JC4N] 
(suggesting that the failure of audits to prevent managers from cooking of books might 
mean that reforms are necessary). 
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failure,5 the Volkswagen emissions fraud,6 the British Petroleum Deepwater 
accident,7 the LIBOR rate-rigging by large banks,8 the options backdating 
scandals involving over 100 companies,9 and the foreign exchange fixing 
scandals by some large banks, just to name a few.10  Many of these scandals 
already have, or are expected to, result in multi-billion dollar settlements.11
What all of these scandals have in common is the failure of the top in-
house corporate attorney, the corporate general counsel (“GC”), to discover 
the institutional dysfunction, fraud, and/or cover-ups; thus, corporate GC 
failed to either prevent the corporation from sliding into fraud and criminal 
wrongdoing or simply report the wrongdoing before it grew.  Why didn’t 
the top corporate attorneys in these and other cases stop the fraud or blow 
the whistle on these frauds, cover-ups, and illegal activities?  This is the 
key question we try to address in this article. 
SOX was the federal government’s response to growing corporate 
fraud around the turn of the century involving Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, 
Arthur Andersen, Adelphia, Global Crossing, and others.  These cases 
convinced lawmakers that the institutional arrangements for detecting and 
 5.  For more information on the GM ignition failure scandal, see GM Ignition, LIEFF
CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTIEN, LLP, http://www.lieffcabraser.com/Personal-Injury/Car-
Accidents/GM-ignition-defect-recall.shtml [https://perma.cc/R9CF-L3TF] (last visited Mar. 
16, 2017). See also Spector, supra note 2 (discussing how some victims also sued GM’s top 
lawyers). 
 6.  For more information on the Volkswagen scandal, see Russell Hotten, Volkswagen:
The Scandal Explained, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
34324772 [https://perma.cc/R9NP-P6BF]. 
 7.  For more information on the British Petroleum Deepwater scandal, see Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://response.restoration. 
noaa.gov/deepwater-horizon-oil-spill [https://perma.cc/J6BC-A226] (last visited Mar. 16, 
2017).
 8.  For more information on the LIBOR scandal, see James McBride, Understanding
the Libor Scandal, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., http://www.cfr.org/united-kingdom/ 
understanding-libor-scandal/p28729 [https://perma.cc/7JGR-4JYY] (last updated Oct. 12, 
2016).
 9.  For more information on the options backdating scandal, see Frank Ahrens, 
Scandal Grows Over Backdating of Options, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 12, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/11/AR2006101100425. 
html [https://perma.cc/883X-Z4HA].  See also Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The
Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2006), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB114265075068802118 [https://perma.cc/4WTR-P3EP]. 
 10.  For more information on the FX fixing scandal, see Sebastian Chrispin, Forex
Scandal: How to Rig the Market, BBC NEWS (May 20, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26526905 [https://perma.cc/2ZUD-ZDVM]. 
 11.  See Michael Ono, 8 High-Profile Financial Scandals in 5 Months, ABC NEWS
(Aug. 17, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/high-profile-financial-scandals-
months/story?id=17023140 [https://perma.cc/9FGF-J8Q8] (detailing the costliness of the 
financial sector scandals). 
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preventing corporate fraud were inadequate and required strengthening.  
Consequently, SOX was quickly passed to enhance reporting requirements, 
strengthen the independence of the board of directors, and increase civil 
and criminal sanctions for violations.12
SOX also designated corporate attorneys as special gatekeepers.  SOX 
imposed requirements on corporate attorneys to report any suspicion of 
violation to the chief legal officer or chief executive officer, and if 
receiving an inadequate response from these officers, to report to the board 
of directors to stop any potential wrongdoing.13  More than any other 
executives in the corporation, corporate attorneys are well-versed in law, 
and are therefore expected both to recognize legal violations and to use 
their legal expertise to advise on, intervene in, and stop wrongdoing. 
In spite of these reforms enacted in SOX and the explicit provisions 
and responsibilities given to corporate attorneys, most of the whistle-
blowing in cases of corporate fraud come from employees (17%), non-
financial market regulators (13%), and the media (13%).14  Clearly absent 
from this list are top in-house corporate counsels.  In this paper, we 
investigate the potential reasons for the failure of corporate counsels to 
report and prevent corporate crime. 
We formulate two mutually exclusive hypotheses to characterize GCs’ 
actions.  The first hypothesis is that fraudulent, top-level executives 
intentionally keep corporate counsel out of the informational loop.15  As a 
result, in-house lawyers are generally unaware of the developing violations 
and therefore unable to report and prevent fraud.16  Thus, corporate counsel 
 12.  See William H. Donaldson, SEC Chairman, Testimony Concerning Implementation 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sept. 9, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ 
090903tswhd.htm [https://perma.cc/XE55-KSTG] (explaining the reasoning behind SOX). 
 13.  See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2014) (“If an attorney, appearing and practicing 
before the Commission in the representation of an issuer, becomes aware of evidence of a 
material violation by the issuer or by any officer, director, employee, or agent of the issuer, 
the attorney shall report such evidence to the issuer’s chief legal officer (or the equivalent 
thereof) or to both the issuer’s chief legal officer and its chief executive officer (or the 
equivalents thereof) forthwith.”). 
 14.  Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN.
2213, 2226 (2010). 
 15.  As a case in point, according to the Examiner’s Report, WorldCom CEO Bernard 
Ebbers simply lied to the GC, Michael Salsbury, that the board approved Intermedia merger 
agreement when, in fact, the board had not.  Third and Final Report of Dick Thornburgh, 
Bankruptcy Court Examiner at 399, In re WorldCom, Inc., 377 B.R. 77 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2007).
 16.  WorldCom attorneys Michael Salsbury and Bruce Borghardt appear to fall in this 
category. Id. at 378 (“The legal function at WorldCom was decentralized, with no in-house 
counsel, including former General Counsel Michael Salsbury and Bruce Borghardt, former 
General Counsel for Corporate Development, charged with responsibility to ensure that 
proper corporate governance processes were followed. The Examiner concludes that an 
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cannot fulfill their gatekeeping role because they simply do not have 
enough information about the potential wrongdoing. 
A second hypothesis is that in-house corporate counsels participate in 
the planning, creation, execution, or cover-up of the fraud alongside other 
top management.  This hypothesis states that corporate counsels are 
typically not only present at the scene of the crime, but they also help 
create the crime; thus they are well aware of the crime and subsequent 
cover-up.  In this case, corporate lawyers would have no incentive to report 
the fraud since they would be turning themselves in by reporting it.17
A possible third, middle-ground hypothesis is that some corporate 
lawyers do become marginally aware of the violations but either have 
incomplete information or worry about retaliation if they report the 
violation, and thus they prefer to keep silent and do not escalate their 
suspicions.18  Since this scenario places the corporate lawyers outside the 
fraudulent group, we combine them with the group in the first scenario 
because they do not have sufficient information about the true extent of the 
corporate wrongdoing. 
Each of these potential explanations has different implications for 
corporate governance and different potential remedies to address corporate 
fraud.  If the first hypothesis (exclusion) is true, then potential remedies 
might include providing greater access to top-level corporate decision-
making authority to the GC.  This can include automatic mandated 
membership in the top decision-making executive committees of the 
corporation in addition to membership on the board of directors, as well as 
the GC’s written approval for financial statements and other major 
corporate initiatives.  If the second hypothesis (instigators and/or aid-and-
abettors) is true, then whistle-blowing protections for GCs might be 
strengthened to encourage GCs not to be tempted into fraud in the first 
institutional and organizational defect, rather than failings by particular individuals, 
contributed to the Company’s injuries in this area.”). 
 17.  Corporate counsel can also take part in illegal activity, independent of top 
management.  On February 5, 2016, Herbert Sudfelt, an attorney for Fox-Rothchild, was 
convicted of insider trading after he purchased Harleysville stock prior to a merger 
announcement and made approximately $79,000 in illegal profits.  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
LITIGATION RELEASE NO. 23461, Defendant in SEC Insider Trading Action Found Guilty by 
Federal Jury in Philadelphia in a Related Criminal Case (2016), https://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23461.htm [https://perma.cc/52WU-CSQN]. 
 18.  Enron attorneys Stuart Zisman and Jordan Mintz appear to fall in this category of 
attorneys who do not escalate their suspicions of violations. See Lisa H. Nicholson, SarbOx
307’s Impact on Subordinate In-House Counsel: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 2004 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 559, 601-03 (2004) (discussing that while both attorneys wrote 
memorandums warning that some large transactions appeared as balance sheet 
manipulations, their warnings were ignored and neither attorney chose to escalate his 
suspicions to the board of directors). 
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place.  This might include an explicit Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) rule stating that corporate counsel are covered by the whistle-
blowing protections that are available to other employees.19  Additional 
regulatory responses might include removing the exemption granted to 
corporate counsel by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) 
of 199520 and allowing a private right of action for noncompliance of SOX 
provisions against GCs. 
We test these hypotheses by examining insider trading by top-level 
executives as well as GCs before, during, and after the class period in firms 
involved in securities class action (SCA) settlements.  We also compare 
insider trading in firms with SCA settlements with those firms that were 
not involved in SCA settlements.  We use insider trading simply to infer 
the information possessed by the insiders.  We assume that this insider 
trading is not illegal per se.21
If GCs are uninformed about a violation until the whistleblowers 
reveal the fraud, then we would not expect GCs to be heavy sellers of their 
own firms’ stocks during the class period, as compared to the control 
periods before and after the class periods.  Similarly, if the GCs are outside 
the fraudulent group and they are only marginally aware of some of the 
violations, they are not likely to know the full extent of the fraud.  In 
addition, they may be afraid to report it due to fear of retaliation.  In this 
case, we again would not expect the GCs to sell their own firms’ stocks.  
Finally, if the second hypothesis is correct and GCs are part of the 
fraudulent group, we would expect them to behave similarly to the other 
top-level executives and to sell their own firms’ stocks before the fraud is 
revealed, and thus benefit from the fraudulent cover-ups. 
Our evidence shows that GCs generally behave similarly to other top-
level executives.  They are heavy sellers of their own firms’ stocks during 
the class periods, and thus they profit abnormally by avoiding the stock 
price declines upon revelation of the fraud at the end of the class periods.  
Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the GCs are part of the 
fraudulent group, and therefore the hypotheses should be treated the same.  
We suggest that policy responses to corporate fraud should include creating 
a separate gatekeeper counsel that reports directly to independent board 
 19.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012) (detailing that employers may not discharge, 
demote, suspend, threaten, or harass any officer or employee because that person provided 
information of fraud within the company). 
 20.  Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 21.  Insiders can also legally trade even at a time when they have material, nonpublic 
information if they set up a 10b5-1 trading plan before they become aware of the material 
information.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2014). 
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members instead of the CEO and additional penalties for GCs, including 
potential disbarment and allowing for a private right of action for fraud 
against GCs.  A third policy response can include mandated hiring of 
outside legal-audit firms similar to financial-audit firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 reviews 
the related literature on the role of corporate lawyers, corporate fraud 
identification, and revelation.  Section 2 contains information about our 
data and methodology.  Empirical results are discussed in Section 3.  Our 
policy recommendations to reduce corporate wrongdoing are in Section 4.  
Finally, we discuss our conclusions. 
I. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Corporate counsels as gatekeepers 
Corporate attorneys perform multiple functions for their clients.  The 
first, traditional role of an attorney is that of an advocate whose main duty 
is to vigorously represent the client.22  In addition to this function, corporate 
attorneys play a second role as transaction engineers—planning, designing, 
and negotiating particular transactions for their corporate clients.23  In this 
role, corporate lawyers act as planners, educators, legal advisors, 
investigators, and representatives of the client.24  In fact, every legal 
document a corporation prepares is drawn up by a lawyer.25  Corporate 
attorneys’ third role is that of a verification specialist, drafting and 
verifying the completeness and accuracy of disclosure documents in 
conjunction with new security issuances, mergers, and acquisitions.26  This 
 22.  See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) 
(outlining the duty of a lawyer to his client and to the legal system); JOHN C. COFFEE JR.,
GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 192 (2006) (noting the shift 
in role of the attorney from a gatekeeper for his client to a gatekeeper “for parties other than 
the attorney’s direct client”). 
 23.  See COFFEE, supra note 22, at 192-93. 
 24.  See id. (discussing the various roles of lawyers that qualify them as gatekeepers); 
see also Sarah Selene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel in Promoting 
Corporate Integrity and Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 989, 1002-12 
(2007) (exploring the traditional lawyering and quasi-legal roles of attorneys); see also
Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing 
the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457, 463-66 
(2000) (reviewing the roles of lawyers as cops, counsel, and entrepreneurs in corporate 
settings).
 25.  See 148 CONG. REC. S6524 (daily ed. Jul. 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi) (“[I]n 
almost every transaction there was a lawyer who drew up the documents involved in that 
procedure.”).
 26.  See COFFEE, supra note 22, at 192-93. 
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third function is also referred to as the due-diligence function. 
While performing these functions, corporate attorneys also interact 
with the general public, investors, and regulators.  Moreover, their 
decisions affect not only their own clients, but also their clients’ 
employees, suppliers, customers, investors in the firm’s securities, 
taxpayers, and thus society at large.  As a result of the wide-ranging 
implications of attorneys’ work, it has been held by some that the attorneys 
also owe a duty to “do justice” to society as well.27  Thus, the attorneys’ 
role as gatekeepers also refers to their responsibilities to society. 
The idea that attorneys owe an ethical obligation to society at large to 
“do justice” goes back to the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Canons 
of Ethics from the early twentieth century.28  While stated as an ideal, this 
responsibility to society at large clearly conflicts with attorneys’ obligation 
as an advocate for their clients.  While the ABA has resisted instituting a 
gatekeeping responsibility for attorneys or corporate counsel, over time, as 
a result of the numerous financial scandals involving attorney misconduct, 
the gatekeeping function of the corporate counsel was gradually 
institutionalized and tightened.  Finally, SOX legally mandated the strictest 
gatekeeping requirements for corporate counsels. 
B. SOX and gatekeeper corporate counsels 
Section 307 of SOX directed the SEC to adopt “minimum standards of 
professional conduct for attorneys.”29  Section 307 expands the coverage to 
outside and in-house attorneys and defines an “up-the-corporate ladder” 
reporting responsibility if the in-house attorney finds material violation of 
laws within the company.30  What constitutes a “material violation” is 
defined vaguely in the law, thus creating ambiguity and subjectivity.  The 
Act defines evidence of material violation as “credible evidence, based 
upon which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a 
prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely 
that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.”31
 27.  Id. at 193 (distinguishing between the duties of a litigator and a corporate lawyer in 
relation to their clients). 
 28.  The ABA’s 1908 Canon 30 stated that a “lawyer’s appearance in Court should be 
deemed equivalent to an assertion on his honor that in his opinion his client’s case is one 
proper for judicial determination.”  Id. at 200. 
 29.  15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002); see also 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003) (stating that the purpose 
of 15 U.S.C. § 7425 is to set minimum standards for the conduct of attorneys). 
 30.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7245(1)-(2) (2002) (requiring that the commission issue rules 
mandating attorneys to report illegal conduct to higher authorities). 
 31.  17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (2003). 
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When an attorney suspects that there is material evidence of a violation, she 
shall report the violation to the chief legal officer or chief executive officer.  
If she does not get an appropriate response in a reasonable time, she shall 
go up the ladder to the audit committee.  Alternatively, the attorney may 
satisfy the duty to report by reporting the violation to a qualified legal 
compliance committee (QLCC) of the company..32
Section 806 of SOX provides legal protections against discharge or 
other discrimination to whistle-blowing employees.33  The law also allows 
the whistleblowers to file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor or with 
the appropriate district court.34  What is not so clear, however, is whether 
protections of Section 806 extend to GCs.  The issue is whether GCs are 
considered employees for the purpose of Section 806 or if they are 
considered a part of the management team.  This issue has not been 
clarified so far.35
Consequently, SOX added to this structure of formal duties of GCs a 
new, fourth responsibility as whistleblowers.  The new rules require GCs to 
investigate any reported potential violation and to inform the top 
management so that management can take the necessary steps to stop the 
violation, or further to escalate the reporting to a compliance committee, 
audit committee, or board of directors of the corporation.36  What SOX did 
 32.  See 17 C.F.R. § 205.5(c)-(d) (2003) (requiring subordinate attorneys to comply 
with the reporting requirements under 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) and (c)).  If the lawyer cannot 
get appropriate response from the QLCC, she has to quit her job and explain the reasons of 
quitting to the SEC.  This process is called “noisy withdrawal provision.”  This is the last 
resort for a lawyer.  Noisy withdrawal is enabled by Section 307 of SOX (15 U.S.C. 
§ 7245); however, it has never been put into effect by the SEC. 
 33.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012) (providing civil right of action to protect against 
retaliation in fraud cases). 
 34.  See id. § 1514A(b) (stating that a whistleblower may seek relief by filing a 
complaint to the Secretary of Labor). 
 35.  See Kim T. Vu, Conscripting Attorneys to Battle Corporate Fraud Without Shields 
or Armor? Reconsidering Retaliatory Discharge in Light of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 209, 212-13 (2006) (noting that precedent implies that attorneys are not employees, yet 
SOX applies to employees only). 
 36.  Rule 205.3(b)2 states: 
The chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) shall cause such inquiry into 
the evidence of a material violation as he or she reasonably believes is 
appropriate to determine whether the material violation described in the report 
has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur. If the chief legal officer (or the 
equivalent thereof) determines no material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or 
is about to occur, he or she shall notify the reporting attorney and advise the 
reporting attorney of the basis for such determination. Unless the chief legal 
officer (or the equivalent thereof) reasonably believes that no material violation 
has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, he or she shall take all reasonable 
steps to cause the issuer to adopt an appropriate response, and shall advise the 
reporting attorney thereof. In lieu of causing an inquiry under this paragraph (b), 
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not do is address how this fourth duty interacts with the three traditional 
roles and responsibilities of corporate attorneys. 
While SOX is explicit about whistleblowing (reporting) requirements 
for corporate attorneys,37 it is pretty much silent on the potential effect of 
whistleblower responsibilities on their strong advocacy responsibilities.  
Gatekeeping requires monitoring company activities to discover and 
prevent misconduct before it happens.38  Gatekeeping responsibilities 
include advising, advocating, and educating all corporate officers of 
potential legal consequences of their actions.39  Clearly, it is difficult for the 
same person who is required to be a whistleblower (a confrontational role) 
to advise, inform, and represent (an advocacy role) at the same time.40
SOX also does not address the potential conflict between other duties 
of the attorneys in their management roles.  Conceptually, it is difficult for 
GCs who are now part of the top management team to monitor and report 
on top managements’ wrongdoings.41  The more GCs act like top 
a chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) may refer a report of evidence of 
a material violation to a qualified legal compliance committee under paragraph 
(c)(2) of this section if the issuer has duly established a qualified legal 
compliance committee prior to the report of evidence of a material violation. 
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2003). 
 37.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002) (requiring the Securities and Exchange Commission 
to establish a rule to require attorneys report violations at the companies for which they 
work).
 38.  See generally Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of 
Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984) (discussing the role of gatekeepers in lowering the 
cost of legal controls). 
 39.  See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2169, 2180 (2004) (noting that lawyers are tasked with advising corporations on their legal 
obligations); Duggin, supra note 24, at 1003-20 (describing the functions of GC); Henning, 
infra note 59, at 360-61 (describing the various advising and reviewing functions that 
lawyers serve in a corporation); Tanina Rostani, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: 
Preliminary Findings and New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 466-67 
(2008) (describing compliance functions served by corporate programs). 
 40.  See Developments in the Law: Corporations and Society, supra note 39, at 2180 
(recognizing attorneys’ “dual, and often conflicting, tasks of advising corporations on their 
legal obligations and monitoring compliance with those obligations”); Duggin, supra note 
24, at 1030 (debating the difficulties an attorney faces when they are witness to damaging 
information); see also Henning, infra note 58, at 352, 356 (noting the difficulty posed by 
GC not being completely independent of the corporation). 
 41.  See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 956 (2005) (describing a lawyer’s role as ambiguous); Deborah A. 
DeMott, The Stages of Scandal and the Roles of General Counsel, 2012 WISC. L. REV. 463, 
491-92 (2012) (noting that the GC’s role as gatekeeper and advisor requires foresight); 
Duggin, supra note 24, at 993, 1040-41 (summarizing the multi-faceted responsibilities of 
GC); Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The Conceptual Fault Line 
in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1089, 1092-93 (2006) 
(contrasting a lawyer’s responsibility to his client with his or her responsibilities under 
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management, the less they will be able to engage as gatekeepers, let alone 
as whistleblowers.42
Overall, given that they have multiple potentially conflicting 
objectives (gatekeepers, advocates, transaction engineers, entrepreneurial 
and managerial responsibilities, and due-diligence providers), it is not clear 
how the GCs will perform as gatekeepers and whistleblowers.  Some argue 
that whistleblowing function will end up suffering the most unless GCs are 
appointed by and report directly to independent board members.43  Others 
argue that GCs are able to perform more routine gatekeeping function such 
as limiting insider trading by other top officers.44  Conceptual arguments 
based on managerial incentives also suggest that the duty that will suffer 
the most should be the gatekeeper and whistleblower function.45
Nevertheless, this is an empirical issue and subject of the tests that follow. 
C. In-house counsel versus outside corporate counsel and 
fragmentation of legal advice 
Over the past several decades, corporations have hired an increasing 
number of lawyers, using both outside law firms as well as in-house 
lawyers, with increasing compensation, status, and responsibilities for all 
attorneys.  Initially, corporations typically had a single legal firm 
responsible for all their legal work.  Over time, with competition, this role 
got fragmented between the in-house attorneys and outside counsel.  
Evidence strongly supports the idea that the in-house attorneys have done 
an effective job of taking care of routine tasks, while outside counsel have 
been relied upon for specialized skills.  This separation resulted in 
increasing quality of financial reporting, earnings forecasts, legal 
astuteness, and tax avoidance.46
Sarbanes-Oxley).
 42.  For a discussion of the effects of conflicts of interest between various duties and 
responsibilities of GCs, see Chris Armstrong et al., Performance-Based Incentives for 
Internal Monitors 2-3 (Rock Center for Corp. Governance Working Paper No. 76, 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553116 [https://perma.cc/2V2Y-94KV]; Sung Hui Kim, The
Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
983 (2005); Sung Hui Kim, Inside Lawyers: Friends or Gatekeepers?, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
1867 (2016). 
 43.  Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Who Let You into the House?, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 359,
365 (2012). 
 44.  Alan D. Jagolinzer et al., Corporate Governance and the Information Content of 
Insider Trades, 49 J. ACCT. RES. 1249, 1249 (2011). 
 45.  See Duggin, supra note 24, at 1030 (suggesting that a GC should resign in the face 
of an employer’s violation and subsequent inaction). 
 46.  See, e.g., Constance E. Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness, 33
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 378, 386-87 (2008) (discussing the effects of fragmented roles between 
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Another accompanying change put the in-house counsel in a unique 
position of representing the firm: becoming part of the management team 
and thus becoming the main channel of interaction with outside counsel.  
As in-house counsels increased in number, the role of the chief legal 
officer—the GC—also changed over the past several decades.  GCs 
increasingly became members of the board and they became responsible 
for basic routine regulatory compliance, risk management, and corporate 
ethics.47  At the same time, the managerial influence and responsibilities of 
the GCs increased.  Top management came to rely on the in-house legal 
team for legal strategy rather than rely on external law firms.  In-house 
lawyers headed by GCs now deal with a range of issues, including legal 
strategy, breaches of antitrust laws, breaches of directors’ and officers’ 
duties, insider trading, fraud, and stock market disclosures.48  GCs are also 
involved in formulating and applying corporate governance principles.49
In addition, SOX further contributed to the change in the position of 
in-house counsels, since it mandated changes in the structure of publicly-
traded companies’ boards.50  As a result, directors’ legal responsibilities 
and financial risks increased, thereby increasing the demand for directors 
in-house and attorneys and outside counsel); Justin J. Hopkins et al., Corporate General 
Counsel and Financial Reporting Quality, 61 MGMT. SCI. 129, 140 (2015); Jayanthi 
Krishnan et al., Legal Expertise on Corporate Audit Committees and Financial Reporting 
Quality, 86 ACCT. REV. 2099, 2126 (2011); Byungjin Kwak et al., The Composition of Top 
Management with General Counsel and Voluntary Information Disclosure, 54 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 19, 39 (2012); Lubomir P. Litov et al., Lawyers and Fools: Lawyer-Directors in 
Public Corporations, 102 GEO. L.J. 413, 472-73 (2014); Beng Wee Goh et al., The Inclusion 
of General Counsel in Top Management and Tax Avoidance 34-35 (July 8, 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2538292 [https://perma.cc/6G5G-
RSVD]; Adair Morse et al., Executive Lawyers: Gatekeepers or Totems of Governance? 25-
26 (Mar. 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2446611 
[https://perma.cc/CSA3-87YK]; KPMG INT’L, BEYOND THE LAW: KPMG’S GLOBAL STUDY
OF HOW GENERAL COUNSEL ARE TURNING RISK TO ADVANTAGE 25 (2012), 
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2013/01/general-counsel-survey-v5.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4P7T-2653]. 
 47.  See Duggin, supra note 24, at 1001-23 (discussing the various roles and functions 
of GC). 
 48.  See DELOITTE, DELOITTE GLOBAL CORPORATE COUNSEL REPORT: HOW THE GAME IS 
CHANGING 2 (Inaugural Global ed. (U.S. Version) 2011), http://s3.amazonaws.com/ 
zanran_storage/www.deloitte.com/ContentPages/2513816748.pdf [https://perma.cc/M827-
K5UJ] (listing in its executive summary the role of corporate counsel). 
 49.  See Duggin, supra note 24, at 1026, 1038 (discussing the trend after Enron’s 
collapse of corporate counsel establishing internal controls). 
 50.  See, e.g., Melissa Maleske, 8 Ways SOX Changed Corporate Governance, INSIDE
COUNSEL (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/01/01/8-ways-sox-changed-
corporate-governance [https://perma.cc/KKG2-ZCU5] (noting the changes to board 
structure as one of the ways Sarbanes-Oxley changed corporate governance). 
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with legal experience.51  Consequently, post-SOX directors are more likely 
to be attorneys or consultants than pre-SOX directors.52  The increasing 
number of in-house attorneys on boards also meant that boards became 
more self-sufficient regarding legal issues and relied less on external law 
firms.
Outside counsels were hired by the GCs for their specialized skills 
related to a specific transaction.  This transactions engineering function 
means that, while the outside counsels were more specialized and more 
independent to render unbiased advice, they were still outside the firm, had 
less information about the client, and could not render holistic advice.  
Thus, the separation of in-house and outside counsel roles also 
accompanied a fragmentation of legal advice along with a reduced ability 
to monitor and provide guidance. 
Literature suggests that, given these potential conflicts and road-
blocks, some attorneys see their role as “implementers or transaction 
engineers,” narrowly focused on a single issue, “rather than as broadly-
gauged corporate counselors or advisors.”53  Second, in-house attorneys 
may be reluctant to constrain managers because they want to be perceived 
as a part of the management, rather than as an obstacle in front of the 
management.54  It is also difficult for in-house lawyers to separate company 
objectives from legal objectives.55  Therefore, they are likely to limit their 
gatekeeping functions and defer to management’s judgments about legal 
risk.56
Another development also points in the direction of fragmentation.  
Surveys indicate that only about 60% of the GCs directly report to the 
CEO.57  This means that in about 40% of the firms, the CEOs do not have 
direct access to legal advice from their chief legal officer.  Inability to 
directly access the CEO also means that GCs will not be informed about 
the entire enterprise.  This fragmentation could be an important factor in 
GCs being left out of the information loop.  Consequently, they may not be 
 51.  See James S. Linck et al., The Effects of Unintended Consequences of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3287, 
3290, 3293, 3320, 3323 (2009). 
 52.  Id. at 3320, 3323. 
 53.  Bost, supra note 41, at 1092. 
 54.  See Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 24, at 477 (“Lawyers are now eager to be seen as 
part of the company, rather than as obstacles to getting things done.  To do so, it appears 
that inside counsel are themselves interested in discounting their gatekeeping function in 
corporate affairs.”). 
 55.  Id. at 472 (discussing how the intense pressure to meet business objectives make 
gatekeeping and advisory more difficult). 
 56.  Id.
 57.  See COFFEE, supra note 22 at 225. 
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informed well enough to suspect that any material wrongdoing is 
underway.  Overall, there is a lot of evidence that in-house counsels have 
created value for the shareholders.  There is less agreement as to whether 
in-house counsels have reduced corporate crime.58
D. Control mechanisms to deter and detect corporate fraud 
Finance literature presents three different perspectives on control 
mechanisms that should deter or detect corporate fraud.59  The first 
perspective is the legal-control mechanism, which states that corporate 
fraud should be investigated and detected by traditional gatekeepers that 
are mandated to do so, such as corporate lawyers, auditors, and securities 
regulators (represented in the United States by the SEC).60  Another 
perspective is the private-litigation mechanism.  This perspective states that 
private parties injured by the fraud should monitor the corporations for 
fraudulent activity.61  The last perspective of monitoring is the financial-
risk mechanism.  This view suggests that all stakeholders of a company, 
such as stockholders, bondholders, analysts, and banks, should monitor the 
company; however, the final and responsible monitor should be the 
shareholders since they are the residual claimants.62
Previous research provides limited support for the legal and private-
litigation views.63  Market regulators, auditors, and private litigation 
 58.  Compare Adair Morse et al., supra note 46, at 3 (finding that hiring executive 
lawyers—as compared to not hiring executive lawyers—exhibits a fifty percent reduction of 
compliance failures and a thirty-two percent reduction of monitoring failures), with
Ribstein, infra note 73, at 19, 32 (casting doubt on the ability of SOX to reduce corporate 
crime) and Peter J. Henning, Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307 and Corporate Counsel: Who Better 
to Prevent Corporate Crime?, 8 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 323 (2004) (explaining limitations 
on lawyers’ ability to reduce corporate crime). 
 59.  See Dyck et al., supra note 14, at 2227 (establishing a theoretical framework that 
explains three perspectives on how to address corporate fraud). 
 60.  Id.
 61.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 669-70 (1986) (detailing a common enforcement mechanism for 
federal antitrust and securities laws through private attorneys); see also Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Schleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN.
1, 1-2 (2006) (describing three hypotheses, including private litigation for security market 
regulation).
 62.  See Eugene F. Fama, Contract Costs and Financing Decisions, 63 J. BUS. S71, 
S88-S89 (1990) (explaining that loan holders and bondholders have an interest in 
monitoring companies, but residual risk is borne by equity holders). 
 63.  See Dyck et al., supra note 14, at 2230 (highlighting that only 3% of fraud is 
exposed by plaintiff’s lawyers through private litigation). 
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lawyers are more successful in detecting fraud relative to shareholders.64
Non-financial market regulators detected 13% of the detected fraud cases, 
media detected 13%, the SEC detected less than 7%, and law firms 
detected only 3%.65  In contrast, employees are the largest group of fraud 
detectors, accounting for 17% of the whistleblowing cases.66  The internal 
governance mechanism covers less than 30% of all whistleblowing cases, 
while external whistleblowing comes mostly from non-financial industry 
agents.67  Among external whistleblowers, private litigation appears to be 
more successful in detecting fraud than public litigation sources (i.e., the 
SEC).68
Evidence on the types of whistleblowers indicates that access costs of 
private information, career-building opportunities, and monetary awards 
are major determinants of whistleblowing.69  Anyone blowing the whistle 
on large-scale fraud can win significant monetary awards.  The success of 
employees appears to be due to the low costs associated with accessing 
information to discover the fraud, since employees can access the necessary 
private information for fraud detection at low or zero cost.70  Journalists 
have some private information advantages and can enjoy great career 
advancement opportunities after they blow the whistle on important cases.71
On the other hand, auditors not only fail to gain from whistleblowing, but 
can lose a significant portion of their business as a result.72  Therefore, they 
do not have as strong an incentive to blow the whistle. 
SOX implicitly assumes that corporate fraud can be detected and 
prevented through regulatory channels.  Consequently, SOX is designed to 
increase transparency, accountability, and sanctions; however, it comes at 
significant compliance costs for public firms.  One view opposing SOX is 
 64.  Id. at 2225. 
 65.  Id.
 66.  Id.
 67.  Id.
 68.  See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An 
Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 759-63 (2003) (noting the SEC’s lack of resources “to 
achieve the optimal amount of amount of detection, enforcement, and deterrence of financial 
frauds,” and noting the supplemental efforts of private litigants). 
 69.  See Dyck et al., supra note 14, at 2231-48 (detailing the various advantages, 
disadvantages, and nuances of the specific groups of whistleblowers and their comparative 
advantage relative to other groups). 
 70.  Id. at 2240 (highlighting that employees have the best access to information largely 
because their participation is vital to some frauds); Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of 
Knowledge in Society, 34 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519-20 (1945). 
 71.  See Dyck et al., supra note 14, 2239-40 (noting that whistleblowing journalists are 
much more likely to release their name when whistleblowing and are more likely to get 
promotions shortly after whistleblowing). 
 72.  See id. at 2232-35. 
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that the compliance costs of SOX exceed its benefits, thereby making 
society worse off even if it leads to greater fraud detection.73  A second 
view is that regulatory enforcement is not the main channel that controls 
corporate fraud.  Instead, private actions, shareholder monitoring, and 
takeovers are important channels to control corporate fraud.74  However, 
SOX has not addressed strengthening shareholder involvement in fraud 
detection and prevention.  This idea of shareholder involvement is 
accredited to Professor Eugene Fama,75 but it is only partly supported by 
empirical evidence.76
Evidence of the effect of SOX on fraud reduction is mixed.77  In the 
post-SOX era, auditors identified more fraud, analysts identified about the 
same, yet employees detected less fraud than in the pre-SOX era.78  The 
decline in whistleblowing for the most important segment (employees) 
suggests that, while SOX is effective in protecting employees from being 
fired, it is ineffective against loss of career advancement opportunities or 
even as a shield against harassment.79  This evidence indicates that more 
needs to be done for fraud detection and prevention. 
E. Relation to insider trading literature 
Our paper also expands upon the literature on insider trading.  
Previous research has shown that insiders trade profitably.  They buy when 
they have positive nonpublic information and sell when they have negative, 
nonpublic information.  The ability of insiders to trade profitably is directly 
related to their position and responsibility within the firm: Top executives 
 73.  See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A 
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2002) (describing the costs 
associated with SOX as perverse managerial incentives, increasing distrust and bureaucracy 
in firms, and impeding information flows). 
 74.  See id. (“The only effective antidotes to fraud are active and vigilant markets and 
professionals with strong incentives to investigate corporate managers and dig up corporate 
information.”). 
 75.  See Dyck et al., supra note 14, at 2214, 2227 (pointing out that Fama predicts that 
monitoring will be done by those parties with residual claims—equity and debt holders). 
 76.  Id. at 2214, 2230 (finding that debt holders are absent in fraud detection and equity 
holders only discover 3%). 
 77.  Id. at 2249 (discussing the impact of SOX on various groups’ incentives to report 
fraud).
 78.  Id. at 2249-50 (showing that auditors’ fraud detection increased from 6% to 18%, 
analysts’ fraud detection stayed the same, and employees’ fraud detection decreased from 
18% to 13%). 
 79.  Id. at 2245 (telling the story of an employee who, despite a successful career, will 
never be employed in that field again as a result of the common costs of whistleblowing: 
“distancing and retaliation from fellow workers and friends, personal attacks on one’s 
character during the course of a protracted dispute, and the need to change one’s career”). 
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typically earn a higher rate of return than officers and directors, who also 
earn a higher rate of return than outside large shareholders.80
Consequently, access to privileged information directly arises as a result of 
day-to-day activities of the top executives. 
In this paper, we utilize the fact that insiders trade profitably to infer 
what insiders and GCs know about SCAs.  If insiders increase their 
purchasing, we infer that they possess positive information.  If insiders 
increase their selling, we infer that they possess negative information. 
We analyze the profitability of GCs not only in the firms with SCAs 
but in all other firms as well.  We compare the profitability of GCs with 
other top-level executives.  To the extent that GCs make similar trading 
profits as the rest of top-level executives outside of the SCA periods, we 
gauge the level of involvement and responsibilities of GCs within the firm 
to be similar to those of other top-level executives such as CEOs, CFOs, 
and chairmen of the board.  On the other hand, if we find that, in general, 
GCs make less trading profits than the fellow top executives but similar to 
officers and directors, this finding would tell us that the level of 
responsibility of GCs would be comparable to that of other directors or 
officers.
Another strand of the literature ties the profitability of insider trading 
to corporate governance and internal control mechanisms.81  Comparing the 
 80.  See, e.g., Arturo Bris, Do Insider Trading Laws Work?, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 267, 
271 (2005) (explaining how acquiring private information can lead to insiders reaping 
economic benefits); John E. Core et al., Stock Market Anomalies: What Can We Learn from 
Repurchases and Insider Trading?, 11 REV. OF ACCT. STUD. 49, 49 (2006) (“[M]anagers’ 
repurchase and insider trading behavior varies consistently with the information underlying 
the operating accruals trading strategy.”); Bin Ke et al., What Insiders Know About Future 
Earnings and How They Use It: Evidence from Insiders’ Trade, 35 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315, 
315 (2003) (describing how insiders increasingly sell stock between three and nine quarters 
prior to a break in a string of consecutive increases in quarterly earnings, but do not 
abnormally sell in the two quarters immediately preceding the break); Albert S. Kyle, 
Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1315, 1315 (1985) (“The 
insider makes positive profits by exploiting his monopoly power optimally in a dynamic 
context.”); H. Nejat Seyhun &  Michael Bradley, Corporate Bankruptcy and Insider 
Trading, 70 J. BUS. 189, 203, 214 (1997) (showing that on average, top executives inside 
trade a significantly larger monetary value than other insiders); H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders’
Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 189, 210 (1986) 
(describing how real high-level executives are more successful predictors of future 
abnormal stock price changes than lower-level officers or shareholders); H. Nejat Seyhun, 
The Information Content of Aggregate Insider Trading, 61 J. BUS. 1, 22 (1988) (detailing 
that insiders tend to buy more stock prior to increases in the value of the stock on the market 
and sell more stock prior to decreases in stock price on the market); H. Nejat Seyhun, Why 
Does Aggregate Insider Trading Predict Future Stock Returns?, 107 Q. J. ECON. 1302, 1329 
(1992) (“The evidence presented in this study documents a strong relation between past 
aggregate insider trading and future excess stock returns.”). 
 81.  See, e.g., Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting 
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profitability of insider trading in firms with large financial settlements to a 
broad set of control groups allows us to examine the relationship between 
the profitability of insider trading in firms with both good and deficient 
control mechanisms and corporate governance structures. 
Finally, a word of caution.  Given that we analyze the level and 
profitability of insider trading by GCs for SCA-involved firms, our results 
are only strictly applicable to the firms that end up in our sample.  If a firm 
is not involved in a SCA, then it is not in our sample and strictly speaking 
we cannot comment on the degree to which the GCs may have played a 
role in preventing the corporation from being sued in the first place.  To 
shed more light on this issue, we do examine the sensitivity of our results to 
the settlement amounts paid later in the paper. 
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data 
This study analyzes the insider trading activities of top executives, 
Scandals, 68 J. L. & ECON. 371, 403 (2005) (detailing that one mechanism of corporate 
governance, a firm whose audit committee includes a financial expert as required by SOX, 
has a significantly lower probability of restating its earnings); S. Burcu Avci et al., Ending
Executive Manipulations of Incentive Compensation, 42 J. CORP. L. 277, 280 (2016) (noting 
that executives use their roles to increase their compensation by using manipulative devices 
such as backdating, bullet-dodging, and spring-loading); S. Burcu Avci et al., Manipulative
Games of Gifts by Corporate Executives, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1131, 1132 (2016) (detailing 
that corporate insiders make favorable donations right before a steep decline in the 
company’s share price, even though if the donations are made at a time when a sale of the 
same stock would have been illegal); Taylan Mavruk & H. Nejat Seyhun, Do SEC’s 10b5-1 
Safe Harbor Rules Need To Be Rewritten?, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 133, 153 (2016) 
(comparing the percentage of sales and purchases with 10b5-1 designations over time); 
Enrichetta Ravina & Paola Sapienza, What Do Independent Directors Know? Evidence from 
Their Trading, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 962, 1001 (2010) (finding that governance quality 
impacts both the profitability of insider trading as well as widens the gap for abnormal 
returns between low and high governance companies); Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat 
Seyhun, Defining “Material, Nonpublic”: What Should Constitute Illegal Insider 
Information?, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 327, 332 (2016) (noting that because of 
vague insider trading laws, insiders have been able to trade on material, nonpublic 
information by buying and selling shares before public disclosures through Form 8-K 
filings, without facing legal consequences); Hollis A. Skaife et al., Internal Control over 
Financial Reporting and Managerial Rent Extraction: Evidence from the Profitability of 
Insider Trading, 55 J. ACCT. & ECON. 91, 107 (2013) (summarizing that firms with weaker 
internal controls generally have larger profits on insider trading); Scott L. Summers & John 
T. Sweeney, Fraudulently Misstated Financial Statements and Insider Trading: An 
Empirical Analysis, 73 ACCT. REV. 131, 144 (1998) (expounding that fraud companies have 
significantly more inventory relative to sales, are growing faster, and have a higher return on 
assets than no-fraud companies in the year prior to the occurrence of the fraud). 
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GCs, and other officials in the companies listed in Stanford Law School’s 
and Cornerstone Research’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse 
(“SCAC”).82  The SCAC has tracked more than 4,000 class action lawsuits 
filed in Federal Court since the passage of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995.83
A SCA contains allegations that the company or its managers violated 
at least one federal or state securities law that caused damages for a number 
of parties.  A case is called a class action because the number of injured 
parties is so numerous that it is not practical to adjudicate each case 
separately.  Furthermore, commonality of interest is required to call a case 
a class action and plaintiffs must demonstrate that the claims of the 
representatives of the class are typical of every class member.84
The period of analysis of the study is 1996–2014, a dataset that 
contains 4,041 filed cases.  Since law firms automatically file class action 
lawsuits if any large negative shock occurs in share prices, it is not likely 
that any large class-action lawsuit would be excluded in this file.85  After 
getting data from the SCAC, we applied various filters to get rid of small or 
frivolous cases.  First, we eliminated the cases that were dismissed or 
ongoing.  After the first round of elimination, we had 2,054 cases left in the 
dataset.  Second, we eliminated cases with a settlement amount below $25 
 82.  Securities Class Action Clearinghouse: A Collaboration With Cornerstone 
Research, STAN. LAW SCH., http://securities.stanford.edu/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/9GLZ-PTRH] (last visited Mar. 21, 2017) [hereinafter “SCAC”]. 
 83.  About The SCAC, STAN. LAW SCH., http://securities.stanford.edu/about-the-
scac.html#about [https://perma.cc/G6CR-FEPG] (last visited Mar. 21, 2017). 
 84.  Rules 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the 
requirements for class certification. Rule 23(a) sets forth four threshold requirements for 
class certification, each of which must be met: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of 
class members is impracticable (numerosity); (2) there are questions of law or fact common 
to the class (commonality); (3) the claims or defenses of the class representatives are typical 
of those of the class (typicality); and (4) the class representatives will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class (adequacy). See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (showing that courts 
have added additional requirements: The courts require (1) that a definable class exists, (2) 
the named representatives are members of that class, and (3) the claim of the class is live, 
rather than moot); Jeffrey S. Gutman, 7.2 Rule 23 Class Certification Requirements,
SHRIVER CTR., http://www.federalpracticemanual.org/node/42 [https://perma.cc/PLM7-
CGQK] (last updated 2016). 
 85.  See Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Securities Litigation Reform 
Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 46 (2009) (describing how plaintiff’s attorneys use 
price drops in stock as an initial screen in selecting which companies to sue); see also Paul 
A. Griffin et al., Stock Price Response to News of Securities Fraud Litigation: Market 
Efficiency and the Slow Diffusion of Costly Information 2 (Stan. L. Sch. John M. Olin 
Program in L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 208, 2000), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=251766 [https://perma.cc/9Q26-C76R] (discussing the first step for 
plaintiff’s attorneys is to analyze stock price declines to see if support could be found for 
filing a complaint). 
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million.  We chose a sizable minimum settlement amount to ensure that the 
fraud and estimated damages were sufficiently large and that insiders 
would take into account the anticipated stock price effects.  For these large 
settlement cases, the median settlement amount represented about 1.1% of 
the estimated damages.86  Based on these numbers, the estimated damages 
for the minimum settlement amount are about $2.3 billion. 
Applying the $25 million minimum settlement filter left us with only 
169 cases.  Third, we eliminated a few companies that are traded privately 
and did not match with CRSP CUSIP number and name.87  Fourth, we 
eliminated companies that had no open market transactions by insiders in 
our insider trading database.  In the end, we were left with a sample size of 
131 companies. 
We collected insider trading data from Thomson Reuters (TFN)88 for 
the analysis period.  The dataset contains the volume and amount of sales 
and purchases of insider trading.  The database comprises the legally-
mandated reporting of all insider transactions.89  We used the information 
on insider trading of top executives, GCs, and other officers.  Top 
executives, directors, other officers, and GCs are classified using role codes 
in the TFN database.  Top executives are limited to officer and director 
(‘OD’), officer, director, and beneficial owner (‘H’), chairman of the board 
(‘CB’), CEO (‘CEO’), CFO (‘CFO’), controlling person (‘CP’), general 
partner (‘GP’), and president (‘P’).  General counsels are coded with ‘GC.’  
Directors and other officers are defined as all other officers.90  We included 
any large shareholder with any officer title.  We excluded outside large 
shareholders (‘SH’) and outside beneficial owners of more than 10% of a 
 86.  See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS 2013
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 9 (2014), http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-
2013/Settlements-Through-12-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB6S-2C7C]. 
 87.  CRSP stands for Center for Research in Security Prices, which is one of twelve 
Research and Learning Centers at Chicago Booth that provides data for scholarly research in 
finance, economics and related disciplines.  CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN SECURITY PRICES,
http://www.crsp.com/about-crsp [https://perma.cc/S832-H8ME] (last visited Apr. 23, 2017).  
CUSIP numbers refer to unique eight-digit alphanumeric identification numbers assigned to 
all publicly listed securities by the Committee for Uniform Security Identification 
Procedures. See What’s Behind a CUSIP Number?, CUSIP GLOB. SERVS.,
https://www.cusip.com/cusip/index.htm [https://perma.cc/XK77-H7B5] (describing the 
CUSIP number process). 
 88.  See WHARTON RES. DATA SERVS., https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ 
[https://perma.cc/GJ7X-MZET] (last visited Mar. 21, 2017) (introducing homepage for tools 
and resources available on the website). 
 89.  See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p, Section 16(a) (listing 
the mandated disclosures for insider trading). 
 90.  Insider trading data can be purchased from Thomson Reuters.  See Thomson
Reuters, WHARTON RES. DATA SERVS., http://www.whartonwrds.com /datasets/thomson-
reuters-2/ [https://perma.cc/6BW2-7HBS] (last updated Aug. 25, 2011). 
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class security (‘B’).  These outside groups are typically hurt by corporate 
fraud and thus are not likely to be aware of any ongoing corporate fraud. 
As a next step, we combined the SCAC information and the insider 
trading information and were left with the insider trading activities of 
companies which were involved in fraud settlements after the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.91  As control periods, we 
constructed pre-class and post-class periods that are the same number of 
days as the class period.  Hence, if the class period is 200 days, then the 
pre-class period would also comprise of 200 days that would end one day 
before the beginning of the class period.  Similarly, the post-class period 
would also be 200 days that start from the end of the class period.  We 
tested the timing of insider trading activities for the pre-class period before 
the class action starts, during the class action period, and for the post-class 
period.  We also compared the results with the insider trading activities of 
companies which are not involved in fraudulent activities. 
Table 1A displays sample characteristics of insider trading in all firms 
in the CRSP database between 1996 and 2014.  This Table provides 
information about trades of different insider groups in the whole sample.  
Purchases and sales are reported separately.  We also classified companies 
into three categories: Small-cap firms are ones with less than a $1 billion 
market capitalization, mid-cap firms are ones with a market capitalization 
between $1 billion and $5 billion, and large-cap firms have higher than $5 
billion market capitalization.  
 91.  See generally Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (establishing legal 
framework for private securities litigation). 
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The table shows that the number of firms involved in insider trading 
and number of trades decrease with market capitalization, while the 
average trade size increases with market capitalization.  It is worth 
considering the differences in number of trades: 894,623 share purchases 
versus 2,862,353 share sales realized during the analysis period.  Hence, 
sales are about three times more frequent than purchases.  The ratio of 
number of shares purchased to number of shares sold is also dependent on 
firm size.  In small-cap firms, this purchase-to-sale ratio equals sixty-one 
percent (9.7 billion shares purchased to 16.0 billion shares sold).  In mid-
cap firms, this ratio falls to about twelve percent (1.2 billion shares 
purchased to 10.1 shares billion sold).  In large-cap firms, the purchase-to-
sale ratio falls further to 4.8% (465.2 million shares purchased to 9.6 billion 
shares sold). 
The ratio of purchases to sales follows similar patterns for officers, 
directors, and top executives.  However, the pattern of GCs’ trades is 
different: The GCs tend to sell about eighty-five times more shares than 
they buy (16.5 million shares purchased to 1.4 billion shares sold).  This 
pattern indicates that GCs typically sell the shares they receive from the 
corporation as incentive compensation. 
Table 1B displays additional sample characteristics of insider trading 
with firms with securities fraud settlement during the same period (1996 
through 2014).  The total number of firms with insider trading in the 
dataset is 131.  The number of firms and the number of trades increase 
along with market capitalization of firms.  These numbers show that there 
is more insider trading activity in big, SCA-settled firms.  The average 
class period is around 600 calendar days, or a little over 1.5 years.  The 
class period appears to be slightly shorter in smaller firms.  
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The average settlement amount increases monotonically with firm 
size.  This finding indicates that larger firms with deeper pockets tend to 
settle for larger amounts.  In small-cap stocks, the average settlement 
amount is around $60 million to $90 million.  In large-cap stocks, this 
amount grows to about $280 million, while the overall average settlement 
is about $170 million. 
The number of sales is 31,704 shares, which is about ten times as large 
as the number of purchases, namely 3012 shares.  Compared to the overall 
sample, firms with SCA settlements have a greater sale-purchase ratio, 
more than ten as compared to the overall sample, which is about three in 
Panel A. 
The average size for purchases is higher than the average size of sales, 
50,000 shares versus 21,000 shares in firms with SCA settlements.  Thus, 
we can say that insiders in SCA companies sell in small amounts, while 
their sales are more frequent than their purchases. 
Using the ratio of settlements to damages, we can also compute an 
approximate figure for stakeholder damages.  Based on these settlement 
amounts, the estimated range of damages caused by the alleged fraud is 
between $6 billion to $30 billion.92  These damage amounts are very large 
and indicate that they likely involve substantial stock price effects. 
Table 1A also shows that the total sales exceed total purchases by a 
factor of seven ($660 billion in sales to $90 billion in purchases).  Similar 
patterns are observed for officers, top executives, and GCs, with increasing 
sales-to-purchase ratio.  For top executives, the sales-to-purchase ratio is 
around nine ($227 billion in sales to $25 billion in purchases) and around 
thirty for GCs ($4.3 billion in purchases to $130 million in sales).  Our 
results indicate that GCs in SCA-settled firms are more aggressive sellers 
compared to top executives, officers, and directors. 
Tables 1C, 1D, and 1E compare insider trading for the pre-Class, 
Class, and post-Class periods.  Overall insider sales increase more than 
fifty percent during the Class period as compared to the pre-Class Period.  
During the pre-Class period, insiders have sold $215 million shares (Table 
1B).  During the Class Period, insider sales reach over $350 million shares, 
an increase of 63%.  This increased selling is consistent with the hypothesis 
that insiders are aware of the overvaluation of their common stock and that 
they are acting proactively to reduce their potential losses by reducing their 
holdings.  Table 1B and Table 1C show that the increase in sales holds for 
each insider group.  The number of shares sold increased 116% for officers 
 92.  The ratio of settlements to damages is about one percent for large settlements.  See
Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Actions Settlements, http://securities.stanford.edu/ 
research-reports/1996-2015/Settlements-Through-12-2015-Review.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M8JP-WJ3B] (analyzing securities class action settlements). 
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and directors, 13% for top executives, and 91% for GC.  
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During the post-Class Period, insider selling declines substantially.  In 
Table 1D, insider selling equals ninety-five million shares.  This represents 
a decline of more than seventy percent from 350 million shares sold during 
the Class period.  Furthermore, selling declines for every insider group.  
The decline equals 80% for officers and directors (from 219.5 million to 
44.3 million), 61% for top executives (from 128.7 million to 49.8 million), 
and 48% for the GC (from 2.5 million to 1.3 million). 
While not shown here, we also explore insiders’ trading patterns 
before and after SOX.  We find similar purchase and sales patterns both 
before and after SOX.  For all three insiders groups, insiders increase their 
sales from the pre-Class period to the Class period, and then reduce their 
sales during the post-Class period.  Hence, our finding indicates that SOX 
has not changed insider trading patterns. 
Overall, the fact that sales first increase substantially from the pre-
Class period to the Class period and then decline substantially during the 
post-Class Period is consistent with the hypothesis that all three groups of 
insiders are aware of the implications of SCA allegations on their own 
firms’ stock prices.  To reduce their potential losses from overvalued 
shares, insiders sell during the Class period.  During the post-Class Period, 
stock prices are closer to fundamental values and the need to sell shares is 
reduced.  Next, we analyze the profitability of insider trading patterns 
during the Pre-Class, Class and post-Class Periods. 
B. Measuring Insiders’ Abnormal Stock Profits 
First, we run a standard event study analysis to determine abnormal 
returns using our sample companies.  Event date (day zero) is the insider 
trading date for each trade.  We measure abnormal returns, AR, around 
insiders’ trades by computing the market-adjusted daily stock returns. 
ARi,t = (
Where ri,t is the return to stock i that insiders have traded for day t, and 
rm,t is the return to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of all NYSE, 
AMEX, NASDAQ, and ARCA for day following the insider trading day.  
Next, we compute insiders’ abnormal profits, AP, for each day around the 
insider trading day: 
APi,t = H* (
To compute insiders’ abnormal profits, we normalize insiders’ trades 
by multiplying insiders’ abnormal returns with one for insiders’ purchases 
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and negative one for insiders’ sales.  Hence, the parameter H takes the 
value 1 for insiders’ purchases and -1 for insiders’ sales.  Abnormal 
profitability is measured relative to market movements.  Thus, following 
insiders’ purchases, insiders are deemed to make an abnormal profit if the 
stock price increases more than the increase in the market return.  If the 
stock market falls, then to be deemed abnormally profitable, insiders’ stock 
must fall less than the market.  Following insiders’ sales, insiders are 
deemed to make an abnormal profit if the stock price falls more than the 
fall in market return.  If the stock market rises, then to be deemed 
abnormally profitable, insiders’ stock price must rise less than the market.  
We then cumulate insiders’ abnormal profits around insiders’ transactions 
over longer-window horizons, T. 
CAPi,T = 
CAPi,T represents cumulative abnormal profits over T days before or 
following the insider trading day, ri,t is the return to stock i for day t, and rm,t
is the return to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of all NYSE, AMEX, 
NASDAQ, and ARCA for day t following the insider trading day. We 
compute cumulative abnormal returns for 10-, 20-, 50-, 100-, 200-, and 
250-day holding periods in order to follow patterns in return around each 
insider trading date.  For comparison purposes, we also measure abnormal 
price movements prior to the insider trading day. 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We provide the main results of our paper in this section.  Table 2 
displays insiders’ abnormal profits computed in non-litigation firms 
between 1996 and 2014.  All three groups of insiders trade profitably.  Our 
database contains over two million trades for officers.  Following these 
transactions, officers and directors earn about 4.1% in abnormal returns.  
For top executives, our database contains over one million trades.  
Following these trades, top executives earn about 5.6%.  Finally, our 
database contains over 63,000 trades for the GCs.  Following these trades, 
the GCs earn about 3.6%.  Abnormal returns for all event periods are 
statistically at about the one percent level for officers, top executives, and 
GCs.  Overall, GCs’ profits are comparable to those of officers and 
directors.
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Next, we turn our attention to SCA-settled firms.  Table 3 displays 
insiders’ abnormal profits in firms subject to securities fraud lawsuits 
between 1996 and 2014 that resulted in settlements.  We examine insider 
trading separately before the Class Period, during the Class Period, and 
after the Class Period.  The first column shows number of observations in 
each period.  As expected, number of insider trading by GCs is comparably 
less than that of officers and top executives since there is only one GC in 
each firm. 
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Examining the number of transactions, we see that insider trading is 
more numerous during the Class Period as compared to pre-Class or post-
Class periods even though the lengths of the periods are identical.  This 
finding indicates that for SCA-settled firms, Class Period represents a 
period of greater information asymmetry and therefore a period that is 
offering potentially greater profitability as compared to pre- or post-Class 
periods.  While this pattern holds for all three insider groups, it is especially 
true for the GC group, again suggesting that the source of information 
asymmetry has legal connotations. 
We analyze insider profitability next.  The first three lines of Table 3 
show the abnormal returns from insider trading of officers and directors 
before, during, and after the class period.  Pre-class period results are not 
significant for 6741 insider transactions.  During the Class period, officer 
and directors increase the number of trades to 9466.  The abnormal 
profitability of officers and directors’ transactions during the Class period 
reach as high as 29.4% during the 250 days after insider trading day.  
Further, officer and directors’ transactions display statistically abnormal 
profitability immediately after the insider trading day.  This finding 
indicates that officers and directors do not refrain from trading close to the 
revelation of the material nonpublic information.  During the post-Class 
Period, officers and directors execute 3846 transactions.  Profitability of 
officer and directors’ transactions continue in this period, with abnormal 
profits reaching about 28.4% after 250 days. 
Top executives’ profitability is shown in the next three rows.  Pre-
Class period results are not significant for 3,887 transactions by top 
executives.  During the Class period, top executives increase their number 
of trades to 6,644.  The abnormal profitability of top executives’ profits 
during the Class period reach as high as 21.9% during the 250 after insider 
trading day.  Further, top executives’ transactions display statistically 
abnormal profitability immediately after the insider trading day.  This 
finding indicates that top executives also do not refrain from trading close 
to the revelation of the material nonpublic information.  During the post-
Class period, top executives engaged in 2,490 transactions.  Profitability of 
top executives’ transactions continued in this period, with abnormal profits 
reaching about 41.7% after 250 days. Once again, top executives’ 
transactions display statistically abnormal profitability immediately after 
the insider trading day. 
Finally, GCs’ trading profitability is shown in the last three rows.  Pre-
class period abnormal returns are negative and significant for 260 
transactions by GCs.  Hence, GCs do not trade profitably prior to the Class 
period. 
During the Class period, GCs increased the number of trades to 1300, 
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which is a four-fold increase from the pre-Class period.  GCs’ abnormal 
profitability during the Class period reach as high as 17.7% during the 250 
days after insider trading day.  However, GCs’ abnormal profits do not 
attain statistical significance until about 200 days after the insider trading 
day.  This evidence indicates that GCs trade more intensely, based on 
material nonpublic information as well as in advance of the material 
nonpublic information. 
During the post-Class period, GCs engaged in only 69 transactions.  
Profitability of GCs’ transactions occurs early, immediately after the 
insider trading day.  For long horizon windows, the abnormal profits are 
not significant. 
To explore the timing issues in more detail, insiders’ abnormal profits 
during the pre-Class periods, Class periods and post-Class periods for all 
three groups of insiders are also plotted in Figures 1, 2, and 3.  In Figure 1, 
abnormal profits fall for all three groups prior to the insider trading day.  
Following the insider trading day, abnormal profits remain flat or continue 
to fall.  This figure indicates that, while insiders tend to buy shares after 
price falls and sell shares after price increases, there are no systematic price 
movements following the insider trading day that would create abnormal 
profits.  Thus, for our sample of SCA-settled firms, the pre-Class period 
does not seem to offer profitable trading opportunities for any group of 
insiders.
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Figure 2 shows the price patterns for the Class periods for all three 
groups of insiders.  The V-shaped figure around the insider trading day 
indicates that stock prices rise abnormally prior to insiders’ sales and they 
fall abnormally after insiders’ sales.  Similarly, stock prices fall abnormally 
prior to insiders’ purchases and rise abnormally following insiders’ 
purchases.  Thus, insiders buy at low prices and they sell at high prices, and 
they avoid the loss associated with the subsequent fall in process. 
From Figure 2, for officers and directors, stock prices rise abnormally 
about 15% prior to the sale day and they fall abnormally about 30% after 
the sale days.  For top executives, stock prices rise abnormally about 25% 
prior to the sale day and they fall abnormally about 22% after the sale day.  
Finally for GCs, stock prices rise abnormally about 40% prior to the sale 
day and they fall abnormally about 18% after the sale day.  These findings 
indicate that GCs time their sales to occur soon after the stock prices have 
peaked.
Figure 2 also indicates that for officers and directors as well as top 
executives, insider transactions become profitable immediately.  In 
contrast, GCs’ transactions do not attain profitability for about 80 trading 
days (about four calendar months) after insider trading day.  This finding 
indicates that GCs tend to execute their sales transactions earlier in the 
Class period as compared to the other executives. 
Post-Class period abnormal profits are shown in Figure 3 for all three 
groups of insiders.  This figure is mostly similar to Figure 2.  Insiders are 
able to time their purchases and sales during the post-Class periods to make 
abnormal profits as well. 
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Next, we separate insiders’ transactions into purchases and sales and 
examine their profitability separately.  These results are shown in Tables 
4A and 4B.  As one can see from these Tables, the profitability of insider 
trading during the Class period is driven by sales only.  Insiders’ purchases 
during the Class period are not profitable for any of the three insider 
groups.  Typically, insiders’ purchases do become positive and statistically 
significant during the pre-Class period for officers and post-Class period 
for the GCs.  In contrast, sales are highly profitable during the Class Period 
for all three groups of insiders.  In addition, insiders’ sales are also 
profitable for officers and top executives during the post-Class period. 
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Next, we examine the relation profitability of insider trading and 
volume of trading.  For officers and directors, these relations are shown in 
Table 5A.  The general finding from the literature is that profitability of 
insider trading increases with increases in insider trading knowledge as 
insiders trade greater volumes of stock on more precise information.93  One 
concern here is that insiders might worry about trading larger volumes 
when they have more precise information since these transactions can 
increase the likelihood that they would be named as defendants in a 
subsequent lawsuit.  Hence whether insiders in SCA-settled firms trade 
large amounts when they have more precise information is an open 
question.  
 93.  See, e.g., H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders’ Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market 
Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 189, 210 (1986) at 204-06. 
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Examining Table 5A, we see that profitability of officers and directors 
transactions in fact do not increase monotonically during the Class period.  
Officers and directors earn 36.5% when they trade less than 1,000 shares, 
24.3% when they trade between 1,000 and 10,000 shares, and 27.2% when 
they trade greater than 10,000 shares. This finding is consistent with risk 
aversion hypothesis. 
The relation between profitability and trading volume for top 
executives is shown in Table 5B. For top executives, abnormal profits 
during the Class period increase monotonically.  Top executives earn 
16.3% when they trade less than 1,000 shares, 27.1% when they trade 
between 1,000 and 10,000 shares, and 35.1% when they trade greater than 
10,000 shares.  These results suggest that top executives do not appear to 
worry about increased likelihood of being subject to a lawsuit.  
39083 ple_19-3 S
heet N
o. 144 S
ide A
      05/11/2017   10:58:06
39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 144 Side A      05/11/2017   10:58:06
C M
Y K
6_AVCI_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17 5:37 PM
2017]WHY DON’T GENERAL COUNSELS STOP CORPORATE CRIME? 797 
39083 ple_19-3 S
heet N
o. 144 S
ide B
      05/11/2017   10:58:06
39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 144 Side B      05/11/2017   10:58:06
C M
Y K
6_AVCI_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17 5:37 PM
798 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19:3 
Finally, we examine the abnormal profitability for GCs.  The relation 
between profitability and trading volume for GCs is shown in Table 5C.  
GCs do not earn a statistically significant profit when they trade less than 
1,000 shares during the Class period.  Their profits rise to 31.3% when they 
trade between 1,000 and 10,000 shares and then level off to 26.3% when 
they trade more than 10,000 shares.  However, there are only 28 such 
observations with more than 10,000 shares traded during the Class period. 
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Overall, our evidence indicates that top executives do trade larger 
volumes when they have more precise information during the Class period.  
For GCs, profitability generally increases with greater trading volumes; 
however, the relation is not monotonic.  Our evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis that GCs do worry about being subject to a greater probability 
of being named a defendant in case of a lawsuit and they hold back trading 
very aggressively. 
Next, we analyze the impact that SOX may have had on insider 
trading behavior of SCA-settled firms.  These results are shown in Tables 
6A and 6B.  Our evidence indicates that SOX did not affect the profitable 
trading behavior of insiders during the Class period.  For the pre-SOX 
period, all three groups of insiders trade profitably during the Class period.  
Similarly, for the post-SOX period, all three groups of insiders continue to 
trade profitably for the Class period.  Our evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis that SOX has been ineffective in controlling profitable trading 
behavior of any group of insiders.
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As a sensitivity test, we also examine profitability of insider trading 
for smaller settlements.  For this purpose, we used $3 million to $25 
million settlements.  There was a total of 307 firms that fit this criterion. 
These results are shown in Table 7.  Our evidence in Table 7 indicates 
that even for smaller settlements, insiders as well as the GCs continue to 
trade profitably.  Comparing our larger-settlement results in Table 3 with 
smaller settlement results in Table 7, we observe that profitability of insider 
trading actually increases for smaller settlements for all three groups of 
insiders.  One possible explanation for these results is that insiders may be 
viewing the costs of profitable trading to be smaller in smaller settlement 
cases.  As a consequence, all three groups of insiders are taking more 
aggressive trading positions to exploit their asymmetric information. 
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While not shown separately, our results also indicate that all three 
groups of insiders sell much more heavily during the Class periods than 
they do during the pre-Class or post-Class periods for the expanded sample.  
Overall, our evidence shows that GCs behave similarly to other top 
executives even in firms with smaller settlements.  Hence, our results are 
more general that just the firms with large settlements.  These findings 
further corroborate the conclusion that, in general, GCs act in concert with 
other top executives. 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Our evidence suggests that the lack of action on the part of GCs in 
stopping corporate wrongdoing is not the lack of access to top-level 
information.  Instead, our evidence indicates that GCs act in concert with 
the other top executives and that they are aware of the corporate 
wrongdoing.  To gain greater cooperation from the GC’s office, we suggest 
the following policy recommendations. 
Our first recommendation is that the whistleblowing protections for 
GCs might be strengthened to encourage GCs not to be tempted into fraud 
in the first place and to gain greater cooperation from GCs to actively stop 
corporate fraud.  Currently, there is ambiguity about whether GCs are 
covered by the whistleblowing protections afforded to other employees.  
Including the GCs under this protection will encourage more GCs to step 
forward and stop corporate wrongdoing before it engulfs the entire firm.  
This might include an explicit SEC rule stating that corporate counsel are 
covered by the whistleblowing protections that are available to other 
employees.94 
We suggest a second policy response should be to remove the 
exemption granted to corporate counsels by the PSLRA and to allow a 
private right of action for noncompliance of SOX provisions against 
GCs.95  By allowing a private right of action against the GCs, the costs of 
passively watching corporate fraud take hold will be increased.  
Consequently, we would expect more GCs to actively stop corporate 
wrongdoing. 
We suggest that a third policy response should be the creation of an 
independent corporate counsel tasked with the sole responsibility as a 
gatekeeper.  This could mimic the function of an internal auditor, protected 
with similar authority and responsibilities.  We would expect the 
 94.  18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012). 
 95.  Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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gatekeeper counsel to report directly to the independent board members 
instead of the CEO.  An additional policy response can include mandated 
hiring of outside legal-audit firms similar to independent financial audit 
firms. 
Our last policy recommendation is for the SEC to ban any GC of any 
SCA-settled firm from representing any client in any SEC business.  This 
blanket ban will ensure that, even if in some cases the GC was not aware of 
the fraud, they would be encouraged to be more vigilant in seeking out 
potential wrongdoing.  Consequently, such a ban should be effective in 
encouraging more GCs to actively stop corporate wrongdoing. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we investigate the potential reasons for the failure of 
corporate counsels to report and prevent corporate crime.  Since corporate 
attorneys are well-versed in law and they are expected to use their legal 
expertise to advise, intervene, and stop wrongdoing, SOX has designated 
corporate attorneys as a special gatekeeper.  SOX imposed requirements on 
corporate attorneys to report any violation to the chief legal officer or chief 
executive officer and if the response from these officers is inadequate, then 
to the board of directors in order to stop any potential wrongdoing.96
We formulate two mutually exclusive hypotheses to characterize 
corporate counsels’ lack of actions in stopping corporate wrongdoing.  The 
first hypothesis is that fraudulent top-level executives intentionally keep the 
corporate counsels out of the information loop.  As a result, in-house 
lawyers are generally unaware of the developing violations and therefore 
unable to report and prevent fraud. Thus, the corporate counsels cannot 
fulfill their gatekeeping role since they simply do not have the information 
about the potential wrongdoings. 
A second hypothesis is that in-house corporate counsels are actually 
present at the scene of the crime.  They participate in planning, creation, 
execution, or cover-up of the fraud alongside other top management.  This 
 96. . 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002); Securities and Exchange Commission’s Standards of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in the 
Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7.  Rule 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 states: 
If an attorney, appearing and practicing before the Commission in the 
representation of an issuer, becomes aware of evidence of a material violation 
by the issuer or by any officer, director, employee, or agent of the issuer, the 
attorney shall report such evidence to the issuer’s chief legal officer (or the 
equivalent thereof) or to both the issuer’s chief legal officer and its chief 
executive officer (or the equivalents thereof) forthwith. 
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1). 
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hypothesis states that corporate counsels are well aware of the fraud.  In 
this case, corporate lawyers would have no incentive to report the fraud 
since they would be turning themselves in by reporting. 
Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that GCs are aware of 
the corporate wrongdoing.  Insider trading behavior of GCs is similar to 
other top-level executives.  GCs are heavy sellers of their own firm’s stocks 
during the Class periods and they profit abnormally by avoiding the stock 
price declines upon revelation of the fraud at the end of the Class periods.  
Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the GCs are part of the 
fraudulent group and therefore they should be treated the same. 
